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Abstract
We are living in the age of so-called economic liberalization. Markets are expanding and 
States are voluntarily limiting their legitimate right as the only redistributing authority of re-
sources. The money market has globalized in such a manner that state has almost lost its 
capacity to hold its redistributive function. Economic liberalization is one of the most domi-
nating policy frame work which is to be pursued and institutionally concretized in many of the 
post-colonial societies as the legitimate and only viable alternative mechanism to regulate 
the distribution of resources. It has been claimed that the market is relatively far more just 
mechanism to distribute the legitimate share of recourses under the principle of efficiency. It 
is very interesting to note that the principle of efficiency has been presented in post-colonial 
societies as the only way to realize the principle of freedom. Because any attempt to counter 
the so-called policy of economic liberalization is presented as anti-liberal. However in Rawl-
sian frame work the principle of freedom is prior to the principle of efficiency. In this article it 
will be argued that in liberal conception of justice expounded by Rawls, the principle of liberty 
is prior to the principle of efficiency, and the distribution of resources through the myth of 
efficient-market-mechanism i.e. independent of State intervention and  governance as redis-
tributive authority is against the principle of liberty according to Rawls. Thus the so called 
economic liberalization and principle of liberty are mutually incompatible.
Keywords: Distribution of Resources, Economic-liberalization, Liberalism, Market, Rawls, State. 
1. Introduction
The contemporary process of economic 
liberalization is generally being presented as 
liberal policy framework. The globalization 
and economic liberalization are the two faces 
of a same coin. The process of globalization 
is presumed to be the universalization of two 
distinct tendencies i.e. the universalization of 
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liberal cosmopolitanism and free market capi-
talism according to Peter Gowan.(Gowan, Leo 
Panitch and Martin Shaw 2001. P.4 ).
This emerging world order which is ap-
parently “spreading across the whole globe 
liberal democratic values and regimes”(Ibid) 
reveals the political side of globalization and 
identified itself as liberal cosmopolitanism. 
This new political order insists on the insti-
tutional guarantee of the legal protection of 
citizens’ human rights and democratic rights. 
The compelling world order has conditioned 
the legitimacy of non-liberal statecraft with 
the acknowledgment and formalization of 
liberal rights i.e. minimal human rights and 
democratic rights, otherwise the so called in-
ternational community which is a coalition of 
liberal West European states, USA and Japan 
will take away, the sovereignty license of “the 
delinquent state.”(Ibid. p.5) In short, we can 
say that the rise of unilateral so called liberal 
order has questioned the sovereignty of na-
tion state under the slogan of liberal cosmo-
politanism.
On the other hand the economic global-
ization is actually the internationalization of 
economy due to the globalization of financial 
markets, “a globalized market which domi-
nates all the national economic parts. And 
so each national economy now subordinated 
to the logic of global market.” (Ibid p.6 ).Thus 
the redistributing capacity of nation state has 
almost become insignificant in contempo-
rary domination of global financial market. 
And market has been acknowledged as the 
legitimate mechanism for the distribution of 
resources. Thus it is actually the age of the re-
construction of nation state as per rational of 
the global financial capital.
The hierarchy of state apparatus is also 
dominated by those who are “more closely 
associated with the forces of international 
capital, treasuries, central banks and so, forth 
were increasing their status at the cabinet 
table” ( Panitch 2001p.10) according to Leo 
Panitch. He believes that this rising trend of 
free market capitalism which is promoted 
and protected by liberal cosmopolitan order 
is actually weakening the political sovereign-
ty and redistributing capacity of nation state. 
He claims that an interesting phenomenon of 
internationalization of state has been mani-
fested. The process of internationalization of 
state is the process, in which “each domestic 
state increasingly not only take responsibili-
ty in the evolution of its economic and other 
policies for managing its domestic economy 
but for contributing to managing the global 
economy”. (Ibid.p.11). Leo Panitch believes 
that the emergence of particular kind of inter-
nationalized community within a given state 
compels state apparatus to incline more to-
wards outside of state i.e. capitalistic dynam-
ics rather than inside. This is what similar to 
Ellul notion (See Ellul 1964)  globalization  i.e. 
always think globally to act locally.(See Win-
charles 2013). The internationalized commu-
nity plays a fundamental role in the justifica-
tion and codification of state’s constitution as 
per rational of global free market economy. 
This process of neo-liberal constitutionaliza-
tion according to Panitch is actually the incor-
poration of “set of legal codes that makes it 
difficult not impossible but difficult to break 
with the disciplinary financial order, free-
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trade provisions and above all the free capi-
tal mobility provisions that are the essence of 
economic globalization.” (Gowan, Leo Panitch 
and Martin Shaw 2001. P.12).
This brief exposition of contemporary dy-
namics of globalization in general and eco-
nomic liberalization in particular which is pro-
tected and controlled by liberal political order 
provides us an opportunity to analyze  this 
process in the light of establish liberal thinkers 
like Rawls so that we can understand the fu-
ture dynamics and limitations of liberal order. 
It is obvious that this process of globalization 
has questioned the redistributing capacity of 
a sovereign state which has been identified by 
Rawls as one of the fundamental condition of 
liberal political order. In the next section we 
will comprehensively discuss the significance 
of redistributive process in the realization and 
sustenance of liberal political order so that we 
can understand the rising internal crisis of lib-
eral cosmopolitanism that it is gradually op-
posing the cause which produces it.
In Rawlsian framework, there is a delicate 
relationship between rules, Institutions and 
basic structure of a society. Rawls believes 
that it is possible for rules to be unjust while 
institutions are just .On the other hand, “in-
stitution may be unjust1 although the social 
system as a whole is not” (Rawls 1971 p. 57). 
The institutional side of Rawlsian conception 
of justice is basically three-dimensional:
i) The institutionalization of equal liberty.
ii) The institutionalization of the distribu-
tive scheme.
iii) The problem of civil duty and its institu-
tional ramifications.
However in this article we will only focus 
on the institutionalization of distributive prin-
ciple of Rawlsian theory of justice. The first 
section provides an initial exposition of Rawl-
sian principles of justice so that we can under-
stand the organic link between Rawlsian lib-
erty principle and his difference principle for 
the sustenance of liberal socio-political order. 
In second section it will be argued that how 
Rawlsian reconciliation of private property 
economy i.e. interventionist-capitalist-econ-
omy and constitutional democracy through 
the institutionalization of second principle of 
justice in general and distributive principle in 
particular guarantees liberal system of justice. 
Through this analysis it will be argued that 
there is no necessary link between contem-
porary economic liberalization and principle 
of liberty rather it is contradictory to Rawlsian 
notion of liberal order.
Section 1
Rawlsian contribution in the revitaliza-
tion of liberalism not just as a philosophical 
thought but as a whole socio-political theory 
is more than obvious. He provides a firm basis 
for the advancement in political philosophy. A 
theory of justice is the refined version of liber-
alism explicating its moral and political stanc-
es. He “revives the English tradition of Hume 
and Adam Smith, of Bentham and of John Stu-
art Mill, which insists on relating its political 
speculation to fundamental research in moral 
1It is important to note that in Rawlsian framework “just order” simply mean liberal order or the order of freedom.  We are interested in the 
analysis of conceptual deviation of the prevailing liberal order under the domination of market rationality. Therefore in this article “Just” will 
be used in specific Rawlsian semantics or in other words Rawlsian use of the term
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psychology and political economy”.(Dworkin 
1971).
A theory of justice not only revives the lib-
eral tradition of moral and political philoso-
phy but it also provides a legitimate realm for 
meaningful inter-disciplinary discourses. “The 
specification of Rawls’s conception of justice 
is a paradigmatically interdisciplinary enter-
prise.”(Pogge 1989 p.7). This cross fertilizing 
quality of Rawlsian analysis is appreciated 
not just by the academicians but the popular 
press as well( Dworkin 1972). 
It is an acknowledged fact that 1960s were 
a hard time for liberalism. On the one hand 
the socio-political conditions particularly in 
the United States, “the civil rights and black 
liberation movement, followed by the an-
ti-Vietnam war movement, brought millions 
of people into conflict with existing political 
institutions”( Daniel 1989 p.xxxv). These ad-
verse circumstances were brought into ques-
tion the authenticity of liberal socio-political 
institutions. The intellectual animosity to-
wards liberalism was ignited because, “liber-
al moral and political judgments were pitted 
against liberal political institutions, and these 
institutions were in turn defended by the lib-
eral political arrangement”(Ibid.). On the oth-
er hand, existentialist and post-modernist cri-
tique along, with the prevailing positivism of 
analytic tradition play their role in the solem-
nization of its collapse. Rawls restates the lib-
eral argument at a time when liberalism was 
becoming unfashionable. Against the positiv-
istic and new-left critique, Rawls provides a 
comprehensive and sophisticated statement 
regarding the actual liberal position (in its 
most diluted and acceptable form) and saves 
it from total ideological bankruptcy. “Logi-
cal positivism and the analytical approach 
seemed to abandon crucial issues of right and 
wrong in favor of technical questions about 
the emotive function of moral language and 
the meanings of moral and political terms” 
(Ibid.p.xxxi). Rawlsian analysis plays a decisive 
role in the emancipation of moral and politi-
cal discourse from mere semantic or linguistic 
analysis.
The Rawlsian conception of society is that 
of a contractually structured association of 
mutually self-interested individuals. The 
self-sufficient association presumes certain 
rules for the distribution of material resources 
among the members of this association. Since 
individuals are essentially self-interested 
therefore the possibility of conflict (regarding 
the distributive share of material resources) is 
organically embedded in such a society. There 
is a need for a just and systematic socio-polit-
ical and economic arrangement for the deter-
mination of fair distribution. Rawls believes 
that the principles behind such socio-political 
organization are the principles of social jus-
tice. The elementary function of these prin-
ciples is to “… assign rights and duties in the 
basic institutions of society”(Rawls 1971. p.4). 
The Rawlsian notion of a well-ordered society 
presumes two conditions: firstly, everyone 
believes that the other members accept the 
same principles of justice; secondly the ba-
sic socio-political institutions generally satis-
fy and are known to satisfy these principles. 
The theoretical corollaries of the Rawlsian 
conditions for the existence of a well-ordered 
society are: a) the social contract takes place 
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among free, rational and self interested indi-
viduals (Individual’s freedom and rationality 
are considered as the structural preconditions 
of their (self-interested individuals) associa-
tions), b) the fundamental principles provide 
the foundations for the constitution and in-
terpretations of further principles and conso-
ciational ventures, c) the essential concern of 
these principles, is to determine the sphere of 
basic rights, duties and the just distribution of 
material welfare. 
Rawlsian derivation of liberal principles 
of justice is in itself a complex issue to un-
derstand the deontological dynamics of his 
principles of justice. The hypothetical condi-
tions of original position in which liberal prin-
ciples of justice have been discovered behind 
the veil of ignorance is in itself intellectually 
challenging but here we are interested in his 
difference principle to understand the nature 
of redistributive function it demands for the 
sustenance of liberal order. Therefore we are 
just referring to his liberal principles of justice 
which are stated as follows: 
1.1. Two principles of justice 
The two principles of justice which Rawls 
put forward as likely to be chosen are: 
First Principle
“Each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive system of basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberties 
for all”( Ibid.p.302). 
Second Principle
“Social and economic inequalities are to 
be arranged so that they are both a) to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and 
b) attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of equality of opportunity” 
(Ibid.p.302-303).
These principles of justice, derived by the 
formal contractors, are claimed to be the best 
possible attempt to reconcile the paradoxi-
cal co-existence of the issue of equality and 
liberty. The two principles assimilate liberty 
related aspects as well as equality related as-
pects of liberalism in a single socio-political 
framework. However, in the establishment of 
his institutional structure, liberty has lexical 
priority over equality. Rawls explicitly states 
that, the first principle is prior to the second, 
because he believes that liberty can only be 
constrained for the sake of liberty itself. The 
conditions he presumes for the justification of 
his restricted conception of liberty are; 
1) “a less extensive liberty must strength-
en the total system of liberty shared by 
all;
2) a less than equal liberty must be ac-
ceptable to those with lesser liberty” 
(Ibid.p.302).
This means that Rawlsian conception of 
liberty is not an anarchic conception. Its politi-
cal predication legitimizes certain constraints. 
Rawls optimistically believes that these polit-
ical constraints eventually yield a better polit-
ical environment for the enhancement of the 
freedom of the individual.
In the second principle, part “b” is lexi-
cally prior to the part “a” (See Rawls 1999). 
This reveals that in order to sustain the equal 
system of liberty, Rawls gives priority to fair 
opportunity over the distribution of material 
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resources. This means that he is not willing 
to accept any scheme in which welfare of the 
least advantaged increases but as a result of 
this the liberty of conscience, personal prop-
erty and political participation is constrained. 
Rawls considers inequalities as natural be-
cause individuals are different in their mental 
and physical abilities and also in their natural 
endowments. He accepts that they have not 
determined their social location rather they 
have been unequally placed in different fam-
ilies, races, environment and social position.2 
The second principle is concerned with 
the equality–related aspect of the theory. It is 
derived on the basis of the abstraction of the 
knowledge about the material resource one 
has or his social position. Before analyzing 
the first part of Rawls second principle, which 
he usually calls as difference principle Rawls 
presumes a social structure in which the first 
principle and the second part of the second 
principle i.e. equal freedom for all, and equal 
opportunity to compete are already being re-
alized. This means that “there is one class of 
equal citizens which defines a common status 
for all” (Rawls 1993 p. 144). The Rawlsian sys-
tem presumes formal equality, i.e. a system 
of rights which treats every citizen equal-
ly before law. This means that before taking 
substantive inequalities (i.e. socio-economic 
inequalities) into consideration, formal equal-
ity is presumed to be established through the 
lexical priority of the first principle over sec-
ond principle. 
The substantive inequalities are the result 
of an unequal distribution of income, power, 
wealth and authority. Rawls believes that the 
inequalities of these primary goods are “just 
if and only if they are the part of a larger sys-
tem in which they work out to the advantage 
of the most unfortunate representative man” 
(Ibid. ).
Rawlsian distributive scheme is based on 
certain assumptions; firstly the inequalities 
of socio-economic system are chain–connect-
ed, which means that the rise in the expec-
tations of the least income group eventually 
raises the expectations of all social positions. 
Secondly Rawls presumes that the inequali-
ties of the social structure are also close-knit. 
This means that it is not possible to raise the 
expectations of one social group in isolation. 
The rise and fall of the expectations of differ-
ent social groups are directly proportional to 
each other. Lastly the inequalities are such 
that there is no loose – jointedness (see Ibid. 
p.144-146). This means that there is no social 
position which remains unaffected with the 
rise and fall in the expectation of one social 
position in the chain. However he acknowl-
edges that there are certain cases in which 
the middle group remains unaffected but the 
possibility of such cases in a democratic so-
ciety is negligible. Thus on the basis of these 
assumptions Rawls claims that “everyone 
benefits from an inequality which satisfies the 
difference principle” ( Ibid. p.147).
Rawls has defended the priority of his prin-
ciples of justice at two different levels:
a) At the level of original position
2Rawlsian position regarding the prioritization of first principle over second principle and opportunity principle over difference principle is 
consistent in revised version of A Theory of Justice .revised edition, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University press 1999.
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b) At the level of institution 
His defence at institutional level is purely 
consequential because he thinks that the va-
lidity of the principles of justice can be tested 
by working out “their consequences for insti-
tutions and note their implications for funda-
mental social policy” Rawls 1971. p.152). 
However his defence from the stand point 
of original position is relatively deductive 
while from the stand point of original posi-
tion he considers principles of justice “as the 
maximum solution to the problem of social 
justice”( Ibid.).
The term “maximum” simply mean “max-
imum minimorum” (Ibid.p.154) . The maxi-
mum rule helps “to rank alternatives by the 
worst possible outcomes” (Ibid. p. 152). Thus 
the maximum rule provides a methodology to 
choose such a “choice the worst outcome of 
which is superior to the worst outcome of the 
other”(Ibid. p. 153).
The adoption of maximum rule in original 
position is attractive due the peculiar con-
straints imposed in the structure of original 
position. The choice of the two principles of 
justice seems to be rational in uncertain con-
ditions of original position (from the stand 
point of the least advantaged group). 
The maximum rule directs the attention of 
the contractors to the worst social existence 
(i.e. least advantaged group) that can be possi-
ble and encourages them to minimize the cost 
of being in that worst condition and to decide 
in the context of that unfortunate situation. 
Thus the self interested and mutually disinter-
ested individuals accept the second principle 
which apparently constrains their absolute 
freedom, which is acknowledged in the first 
principle. So the lesser freedom is acceptable 
for such mutually disinterested contractors if 
the anti-egalitarian consequences maximize 
the benefits of the least advantaged group. 
It is obvious that the max-min principle 
offers constraints on to the right of property 
or accumulation, which naturally restricts in-
dividual freedom. The question arises why do 
the contractors necessarily choose the second 
principle in the original position? One possible 
answer is that since the individual is ignorant 
about his own social position in the upcoming 
society, therefore being rational and self-in-
terested he legitimately withdraws from his 
absolute right of accumulation. The contrac-
tor accepts that the greatest benefit should go 
to the least advantaged section of the society. 
This sort of derivation reveals Rawls’ precon-
ceived notion of rationality. The rationale of 
the original position presumes two principles 
which have not been chosen but presumed by 
the contractors in the original position. They 
determine the parameters of the hypotheti-
cal choice situation3. The principles are: a) The 
principle of “rational choice”. b) The principle 
of “deliberative rationality”
The principle of rational choice justifies 
the derivation of the two principles of justice, 
whereas deliberative rationality provides the 
justification of the individual’s pursuit of one’s 
own conception of the good and also the or-
dering of one’s own preferences and desires. 
There is a harmony between the principles of 
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rational choice and that of deliberative ratio-
nality. In the Rawlsian framework delibera-
tive rationalization must be “consistent with 
the counting principles and other principles 
of rational choice” Rawls (1971 p. 417). It is 
important to note that the rationale of the 
original position presumes certain constraints 
which make the principles of justice culturally 
acceptable and compatible with the prevail-
ing convictions about justice. 
In an uncertain condition the rational be-
havior of an individual is based on:
i) Knowledge of his wants.
ii) Knowledge of the shape of his (convex) 
utility function. 
iii) Quest for the maximization of satisfac-
tion subject to the constraint of risk 
aversion.
Although in the original position individuals 
are ignorant about their own specific concep-
tions of the good they know how to act ratio-
nally. They know that they must sustain their 
capacity to revise their conceptions of the 
good in an uncertain condition in which they 
do not even know their own specific concep-
tions of the good. Rational behaviour is that 
by which individuals try to maximize satisfac-
tion while averting risk, and thus they choose 
the principles of justice. Rawls believes that 
being rational persons they must choose the 
first principle in order to sustain their capacity 
to frame, revise and pursue their own specific 
conceptions of the good of which they are ig-
norant. On the other hand they must choose 
second principle because being rational the 
contractors maximize their opportunities in 
the worst condition and minimize the cost of 
being in that worst condition.
A re-distributive mechanism (governed by 
the difference principle) of primary goods is 
to improve the capacities of those unfortu-
nates who are left behind by cultivating their 
natural abilities (which are necessary to cope 
with the demand of competitive societies) at 
the cost of fortunate sections of society. Raw-
ls acknowledges that apparently “difference 
principle” contradicts the lexical priority of 
the first principle, because the least advan-
taged section of a society is subsidized at the 
cost of the fortunate group (most advantaged 
group). So that difference principle limits the 
sphere of freedom of fortunate group. In his 
defense however Rawls claims that since in 
the original position individuals are ignorant 
about their own social position therefore be-
ing rational individuals, “they will find it to 
their interest to agree to a principle”(Ibid. 
p.146) which apparently maximizes the living 
standard of least advantaged at the cost of 
upper income groups. The difference princi-
ple does not negate the efficiency principle in 
absolute sense, but it is argued that the subsi-
dization of one group cannot be possible with-
out taxing the upper income groups. Since the 
natural abilities and talents of individuals are 
unequally distributed therefore it is generally 
argued that claim of equality of opportunity” 
is fictitious. It is further argued that those who 
belong to higher income groups cultivate their 
crud abilities or skills due to the availability of 
better resources, services and socio-cultural 
3Rawls J.“The right and good contrasted” in liberalism and its critique by M. Sandal (ed.) Oxford Basil Black well 1984.in which he has pre-
cisely acknowledges that the principle of deliberative rationality and principle of rational choice are the unconditional presumptions for the 
constitution of initial choice situation. p.48
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environment therefore the institutional assur-
ance of equality of opportunity is meaningless 
among unequally equipped individuals. In jus-
tice as fairness “the two principles of justice 
define distributive shares in a way compatible 
with efficiency” ( Ibid.). The subsidization of 
the least advantaged at the cost of the most 
efficient group is not the rejection of efficien-
cy principle rather he presumes that “when 
the difference principle is perfectly satisfied, 
the basic structure is optimal by the efficiency 
principle”(Ibid.). 
The second principle also legitimizes the 
priority of the right over the good. Justice as 
fairness rejects the criterion of distribution 
according to moral desert. Rawls believes that 
it is difficult to “distinguish between moral 
desert and legitimate expectations” (Rawls 
1984.p.44). However in Rawlsian procedural 
conception of justice the individuals can claim 
“fair shares” of resources according to the 
rights given to them and the compatibility of 
their claims to the existing socio-political ar-
rangement. In a well-ordered society the dis-
tributive share of the individual should not be 
dependent on the moral worth of a particular 
conception of the good which he chooses in 
his private life. This means that in theory there 
is no one to one correspondence between the 
distributive mechanism and moral preference 
of the individuals. Rawls believes that in order 
to sustain the mechanism of justice as fairness 
it is necessary to emancipate the distributive 
function from the moral desert principle. Be-
cause there is no direct relationship between 
the moral worth of an individual and his pro-
ductive capability, therefore Rawlsian distrib-
utive mechanism remains neutral regarding 
the moral states of an individual. Since jus-
tice as fairness remains neutral regarding the 
question of good, thus the issue of the distri-
bution of primary goods is resolved on the ba-
sis of the body of rights, which has been pri-
oritized over individual’s conceptions of good. 
It is important to note that this distributive 
mechanism presumes a well-ordered society, 
the society in which the socio-political insti-
tutions “are just (and are also) publicly recog-
nized as just” (Ibid. p.45). Since this distribu-
tive mechanism reflects the public conception 
of justice, it means that, it cannot be a-moral, 
but Rawls believes that the moral worth of 
the presumed conception of the good by the 
individual has trivial significance. The co-re-
lation between moral worth and distributive 
shares can also be interpreted within the con-
text of the “retributive” conception of justice. 
This presumes that those who belong to well-
off sections of society must possess superior 
moral claims. This moral superiority provides 
them greater opportunity to increase their 
distributive shares against those who violate 
the laws of the just society and are justly pun-
ished by deprivation. This argument confus-
es morality with legality, most of the times it 
happens that morality and legality does not 
match. This is one of the reasons that the ra-
tionale of justice as fairness does not allow an 
interpretation of the distributive principle in 
the retributive conception of justice. 
The individual’s conception of the good 
is determined by “what is for him the most 
rational-long-term plan of life given reason-
ably-favorable circumstance”(Ibid. p.93). The 
primary goods according to Rawls are neces-
sary instruments for actualizing any rational 
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desire. Since different people have different 
conceptions of the good therefore the distri-
bution of primary social goods is a core con-
cern of justice as fairness. 
The contractors in the original position bar-
gain about the possession of the fair share of 
these primary social goods. So Rawls explains 
the prioritization of primary goods in the con-
text of his “thin theory of the good”. The thin 
theory presumes that the knowledge of the, 
“thin conception of the good” is not blocked 
by the veil of ignorance. Therefore the pro-
cess of bargain (in original position) presumes 
primary good index as a substantive criteri-
on that qualifies the legitimate distributive 
shares according to the patterns of expecta-
tions of different social groups. 
Rawls argues that since individuals are dif-
ferent in their abilities, capacities and poten-
tialities therefore, their plan of life also differs 
but he believes that “primary goods are neces-
sary means (to realize any system of ends)”(I-
bid.). The determination of the weightage of 
these primary goods is a problematic issue but 
he argues that the lexical order of the princi-
ples of justice simplifies this problem. Rawls 
believes that the weightage of the primary so-
cial goods and their (distributive) proportional 
combination is known by us intuitively4. This 
implies that the rational ordering (of primary 
goods) of the representative individual of the 
least advantaged group can only by known by 
“our intuitive capacities” (Ibid.p.94), although 
“self-respect” is lower in the priority list of so-
cial good, it is important to note that the prior-
ity of this social good is not determined by the 
second principle rather by the first. “Rawls ap-
peals extensively to self-respect in support of 
his first principle and its lexical priority”(Ibid.). 
However he acknowledges that the protec-
tion of formal equality of basic liberties is not 
the ultimate guarantee for the sustenance of 
the individual’s sense of self-respect, because 
economic inequalities eventually generate a 
consciousness, which negates the possibility 
of self-respect.
Rawls has also tackled the problem of the 
individual’s “criterion of expectation” through 
the distribution of primary goods. He rejects 
the utilitarian criterion of individual expecta-
tions. In his perspective the expectations of 
individual should be defined in terms of the 
primary social goods rather than in term of 
pleasure or satisfaction. It appears that the 
distribution of these primary goods is the con-
cern of equality related aspect of his theory 
of justice, because primary social goods are 
the legitimate instrument to actualize sub-
stantive conception of the good presumed by 
formal, rational and self-interested individu-
als. But we cannot ignore the organic relation 
between primary goods and the liberty-relat-
ed aspect of the theory of justice, because if 
individuals do not possess the primary social 
goods then the claim “to be free” is fictitious. 
To be free in the real sense is the ability to ac-
cumulate these primary goods. The primary 
goods are the concrete form of freedom and 
one can never realize one’s freedom except 
thought the accumulation of these goods. 
Rawls claims that “it is rational to want those 
goods whatever else is wanted. Since, they are 
in general necessary for framing and the exe-
4It is a problematic side of his formulation because the criterion is shifted from rational choice to ethical intuitionism see Ibid p. 94-97.
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cution of a rational plan of life” (Rawls 1971.p. 
433). In reality these are the pre-conditions 
for freedom. Thus if we provide an equitable 
distribution of these primary goods then what 
we are promoting is freedom. 
In the light of above discussion we can say 
that conception of justice which emerges from 
Rawlsian principles of justice is essentially a 
liberal conception of justice. In his framework 
the individual alone determines what is (pri-
vately) good for him, subject to the constraint 
that the only public good is freedom. Rawls’ 
emphasis on the issue of distribution creates 
an illusion that he is more committed with 
equality then liberty. In his framework the 
distribution of material resources becomes 
the fundamental question because his theo-
ry of justice is concerned with the allocation 
of primary goods as the only means to realize 
freedom. He tries to reinterpret the meaning 
of the individual’s substantive conception of 
the good. If one rejects the right of self-deter-
mination regarding the autonomous pursuit 
of the substantive conception of the good, 
then the issue of distribution becomes irrel-
evant. The prioritization of distributive justice 
is based on the right of self–determination. 
This is so because if the individual is free to 
pursue his own (private) conception of the 
good, he can only operationalize his freedom 
on the basis of primary social goods. Thus the 
distributive principle becomes the fundamen-
tal principle of a liberal society because it en-
sures the concrete manifestation of the right 
of self-determination. 
Rawls believes that the institutionalization 
of the two principles of justice is possible only 
in a private property economy and constitu-
tional democracy. In our next section we will 
focus on the institutional implications of the 
second principle of justice.
Section 2
The Institutionalization of Second princi-
ple of justice:
The distributive side of the theory of justice 
comes under the heading of second principle. 
Rawls provides the scheme of the institution-
al arrangement (regarding the distribution of 
material welfare) necessary for the constitu-
tion of a modern liberal statecraft. The princi-
ples of justice in general and second principle 
in particular provide the basis of “a doctrine 
of political economy” (Ibid. p.258). Rawls con-
sciously avoids the term “welfare’ because 
of its linguistic identification with utilitarian-
ism. He rather prefers to use the phrase “so-
cial choice” to identify the object of distribu-
tion. He believes that any doctrine of political 
economy presumes a particular conception 
of the “public good” which serves as an eval-
uative criterion to judge the socio-economic 
policies. The legalization of socio-economic 
phenomena, according to Rawls, directly af-
fects the basic structure of the society, social 
system, and structures of desires, aspirations 
and preference of its citizens. On the other 
hand, economic structure provides the insti-
tutional framework to satisfy their desires, 
wants and needs. The economic structure not 
only satisfies the existing needs and wants of 
its citizens but it also provides a “way of creat-
ing and fashioning wants in the future.”(Ibid. 
p.259). The choice of these socio-economic 
arrangements is determined by the concep-
tion of “human good” and the “institutions”, 
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which are designed to realize those ends. 
Rawls acknowledges that the social coopera-
tion without any conception of “human good” 
is not possible. He claims that justice as fair-
ness provides a framework in which any inter-
pretation of human good (i.e. political, moral, 
aesthetical, and economic) is realizable which 
is not in conflict with the prioritized principles 
of justice in general and ‘will to freedom’ in 
particular. 
The issue of “public good” is central as 
far as the issue of distribution is concerned; 
therefore Rawls tries to justify the authentic-
ity of “contract theory” in the derivation of a 
public conception of the good. He specifically 
claims that the superiority of contract doc-
trine as an alternative to ethical intuitionism 
and moral perfectionism. Traditionally, it was 
believed that there is no “Archimedean posi-
tion” other than ethical intuitionism & moral 
perfectionism to judge the “real aim” or “pub-
lic good”.
Rawls claims that his conception of origi-
nal position and derivation of the principles 
of justice is a unique alternative to judge the 
most abstract and highly general human so-
cial good that “men are presumed to want 
whatever else they want”(Ibid. p.260). He 
acknowledges that the list of these identified 
“primary social goods is may be based on psy-
chological premises and these may prove in-
correct” but he emphasizes that the identified 
goods are necessary to pursue any rational 
plan of life. He believes that theory of justice 
does presume a theory of good, but the the-
oretical as well as institutional nomenclature 
of the theory of justice are so, flexible5  that 
the conception of the good does not affect 
the pursuit or “choices” of individuals to plan 
their life according to their own will. In short 
it is a purely secular framework in which any 
conception of good is realizable6  except one 
which contradicts the public good i.e. equal 
freedom. 
According to Rawls, the “contract doctrine” 
presumed by theory of justice offers certain 
constraints on the conception of good, which 
serves two purposes simultaneously:
a) It establishes the priority of “justice” 
over “efficiency” because people are 
naturally unequal in their efficiencies 
but even than they are all equally hu-
man and have equal right to be treated 
justly.
b) It also ensures the priority of individ-
ual freedom over social and economic 
advantages, because the precedence 
of liberty over all other conceptions of 
good is necessary to sustain the secular 
framework. 
Any desire or plan of life, which violates 
the ultimate priority of justice, would be con-
5See Ibid page 260, the reason of his deceptive flexibility is that Rawls prioritizes ‘right’ over the “good” in the constitution of just socio-po-
litical order and “good” has trivial significance in constitution of just socio-political order.  
6See page 258-62. It is theoretically claimed that in such political procedure any conception of good is realizable but in actuality it is not the 
case, because the conception of good which is organically linked with the Rawlsian conception of Justice is such, which de-construct any 
particular conception of good, form of life, communal bond etc. which reject absolute priority of “individual freedom” as an only legitimate 
public good
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sidered as illegitimate. The Rawlsian condi-
tion regarding the legitimacy of the desires or 
plans of life is presumed to be an “institution-
al criterion” to judge the legitimacy of desires 
and also discourage those desires which are 
in conflict with the principles of justice. There-
fore, there is a need to construct an institu-
tional framework which performs two func-
tions:  
i)  Promote the virtues of justice as fairness 
ii) Discourage those desires or plans of life, 
which are in conflict with the virtues of 
justice as fairness.
In this way Rawls implicates a criterion of 
how a citizen should be. That is to say that 
through the principle of justice he provides 
“a partial ideal of the person which social and 
economic arrangement must respect”(Ibid. 
p.261). Moreover, through the institutional-
ization of the principles of justice, Rawls es-
tablishes an Archimedean position to assess 
the long-term interests of society “irrespec-
tive of the particular desires and needs of its 
present members”( Ibid.). The nature of the 
principles of justice is such that it presumes 
certain institutional structures. These Institu-
tions offer certain constraints on individual’s 
desire or plans of life, which are incompatible 
with justice as fairness. So there is a resem-
blance between perfectionism and justice 
as fairness, as both offers certain constrains 
on immediate pursuit of the existing desires, 
which are incompatible with the ideal of the 
person presumed by these theories. 
Rawls acknowledges that utilitarianism 
also provides a ground for choosing among 
different ideals of the person i.e. “greatest 
happiness for greatest numbers” but the prob-
lem lies in the institutional application of the 
principle of utility.  In utilitarian perspective, 
“initial conditions (i.e. existing desires and 
present circumstances) may heavily influence 
the conception of human good that should 
be encouraged”(Ibid. p.262). So utilitarianism 
collapses into vulgar consequentialism. How-
ever Rawls believes that the ideal of person or 
the fundamental criterion of social structure 
is purely a-consequential in justice as fairness 
and perfectionism 
Justice as fairness is embrionically an indi-
vidualistic approach but at the same time it 
is not purely subjective regarding the issue 
of human good at the public level. Rawlsian 
principles of justice provide objective institu-
tional standards to differentiate between le-
gitimate and illegitimate desires, wants and 
aspirations. The contractarian basis of justice 
as fairness provides an alternative to perfec-
tionist or a priori principles regarding the at-
tainment of the vantage position to judge the 
mechanism of fair social order.
Rawls believes that in a contractually struc-
tural society the general desire of primary so-
cial goods provides the basis of agreement 
among self-interestedly-motivated individ-
uals. The framework of the original position 
sustains:
i) Neutrality and the fairness of agree-
ment.
ii) The objectivity of the general desires of 
primary social goods.
iii) The list of the primary social goods.
iv) Unanimity of the agreement (among 
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equally free rational and self-interest-
ed individuals), because Rawls believes 
that, “the deliberation of any one per-
son is typical of all”(Ibid.p.263).
v) Equal sense of justice.
According to Rawls, the idea of unanimity 
presumed in the theory of justice must not 
be confused with the political philosophy of 
idealism. The basis of general consensus is 
contractarian in nature therefore “there is 
nothing characteristically idealistic about the 
supposition of unanimity”(Ibid.). The deriva-
tion of consensus is the byproduct of a bar-
gaining process among self-interested indi-
viduals. Thus, the idea of homogeneity has 
also been derived by Rawls from the idea of 
unanimity. According to him, the idea of una-
nimity has been interpreted differently in 
traditional moral philosophy, which provides 
the basis and legitimacy of the structural for-
mation of political order. With reference to 
his idea of unanimity justice as fairness pri-
oritizes a-social individualism but the impor-
tance of community (by community he simply 
means contractually structured collectivity) is 
not being ignored and has properly been ac-
commodated by Rawls in his idea of unanim-
ity. The role of community in the derivation 
of human good is central. It also provides the 
initial basis of contractual association among 
self-interestedly motivated individuals. The 
distributive scheme of Rawlsian procedural 
conception of justice presumes a particular 
conception of public order which characteriz-
es the features, values, convictions and moral 
intuitions of a society. If we take a glance of 
the background institutions of his distributive 
mechanism we can realize that he tries to in-
stitutionally ensure all those aspects of social 
constitution which are necessary to sustain 
liberal public order.
2.1. The Background Institutions for Dis-
tributive Justice
It seems that for Rawls the basic structure 
of a society is an organic whole. The major 
socio-political institutions are the binding 
agency, which sustains that structure. On the 
other hand, the principles of justice provide 
an evaluative criterion of social justice. Rawls 
believes that central problem of distributive 
justice, “is the choice of a social system”(Ibid. 
p.274) which is compatible with the principles 
of justice.
Rawls believes that social and economic 
process should properly be channeled by the 
political and legal institutions. This, on the 
one hand, implies that Rawls prioritizes pol-
itics over economics and on the other hand, 
social justice in general and distributive jus-
tice in particular both are impossible in the 
absence of fair, efficient and neutral legal in-
stitutional structure compatible with the prin-
ciples of justice.
Rawls has divided the background insti-
tutions of government into four different 
branches:
I. The allocation branch
II. The stabilization branch
III. The transfer branch
IV. The distributive branch
According to him, each branch has its own 
domain of activities and consists of various 
supporting agencies according to the demand 
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of specific socio-economic conditions. The al-
location branch is responsible to keep price 
system competitive and sustains its workabil-
ity against unhealthy market tactics. The allo-
cation branch controls market function, for in-
stance maintains competitive system of price. 
The allocation branch is also responsible to 
identify or to correct different sections of 
economy, which are needed to be subsidized 
or taxed. Furthermore, it is also responsible 
to define or (in most cases) redefine property 
right, (if necessary) for the realization of the 
principles of justice. 
The stabilization branch resolves the prob-
lems, which emerge due to the economic pro-
cess, for instance problem of unemployment, 
inflation, free choice of occupation and also 
money supply and sustains effective mecha-
nism of demand /supply. The major function 
of this branch is to stabilize the economic sys-
tem. The assessment and evaluation of needs 
(or an appropriate standard of life) is ad-
dressed and compensated by transfer branch. 
According to him, “transfer branch guaran-
teed a certain level of well-being and honors 
the claims of need”(Ibid.p.276).
The basic function of these branches is to 
associate different precepts with specific in-
stitutions. The different precepts are judged 
and balanced on the basis of their compati-
bility with the principles of justice. The role of 
transfer is very crucial because it provides the 
minimum standard of well-being. Therefore, 
Rawls believes that after maintaining the min-
imum standard of well-being of the citizens it 
would be “perfectly fair that the rest of the 
total income be settled by the price system” 
by presuming that the major cause of monop-
olistic exploitation and “unreasonable exter-
nalities have been eliminated”(Ibid. p.277).
Lastly, Rawls mentions the function of the 
fourth branch, i.e. distributive branch. Rawls 
believes that preservation of the approximate 
justice in distributive share is the core con-
cern of the distributive branch. In concrete 
sense the regulation of the system of taxa-
tion along with the reasonable adjustment in 
property right (subject to the constraint that 
the adjustment does not violate the principles 
of justice) is the major function of this branch.
Rawls divides the distributive branch into 
two parts, both of which correspond to each 
principle of justice respectively. One aspect of 
this branch limits the concentration of capital 
/ power, and at the same time controls the 
factors, which do effect the realization of “fair 
political liberty and fair equality of opportu-
nity”(Ibid.). The other aspect of this branch 
is responsible to generate capital (revenues) 
necessary for the governmental expenditures 
regarding the distribution of public good. 
Rawls precisely claims that each dimension 
of distributive branch corresponds to the two 
principles of justice. The institutionalization 
of taxation, redefinition of property right etc. 
are the institutional strategies to protect the 
legitimacy of those political institutions which 
ensure fair equality of liberty (i.e. first princi-
ple). On the other hand, the collected reve-
nue from taxation finances the public good 
which at the same time subsidizes the least 
advantaged section of the society as well as 
ensures the fair equality of opportunity. Thus, 
the second principle is institutionally realized. 
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The problem of distribution could be 
tackled either by the regulation of income 
structure i.e. by setting out the standards of 
minimum wages or by the satisfaction of the 
claims of basic needs, that is, the satisfac-
tion of the minimum standards of well-being. 
Rawls considers the later approach towards 
the establishment of social justice as much 
more effective than that of the former. There 
are two major reasons behind this as follows:
a) The standardization of the “claims of 
need”, i.e., the minimum standard of 
well-being is not the realm of market. 
There must be a need of extra-market 
or supra-market arrangement, i.e., of 
state which determines the criterion 
of “social minimum”. This legitimizes 
the priority of politics over economics 
(Ibid.p.276). 
b) In Rawlsian distributive scheme, the di-
vision of the different branches is basi-
cally the division of different tasks. The 
nature of the tasks assigned to each 
branch is at the same time claimed to 
be:
i) Compatible and reinforces the task of 
the other branches.
ii) Consistent with the spirit of the justice 
as fairness in general and principle of 
justice in particular. 
The above mentioned background insti-
tutions of government reveal a paradoxical 
relation between state and market. The state 
/ market relationship (derives from Rawlsian 
distributive scheme) provides the basis of 
economic theory and political economy. But 
in theory of justice Rawls is not directly con-
cerned with the explanation or analysis of 
economic theory. He focuses on the problems 
of political economy only pertaining to the 
question of social justice.  
2.2. Distributive justice and state/market 
relationship
Rawls claims that the purpose of discus-
sions about economic theory is to substanti-
ate the implications and scope of his principles 
of justice (Ibid.p.265). He wants to analyze the 
practicality of difference principle in the con-
text of contemporary ideas of political econ-
omy. He analyzes the issues of political econ-
omy from the perspective of a “citizen who is 
trying to organize his judgment concerning the 
justice of economic institutions.”(Ibid.) Gener-
ally, an economic system is defined by six core 
factors namely (1) Production, (2) Means of 
production, (3) Consumption and the nature 
of consumer, (4) Labor contribution, (5) Role 
of saving and investment of social resources 
and (6) Provision of public goods. .(Ibid.p.266)
According to Rawls, ideally all these factors 
“should be arranged in ways that satisfy the 
two principles of justice.”(Ibid.). The core con-
cern of distributive justice is the equitable dis-
tribution of public goods. The size of the public 
sector is very crucial in the institutionalization 
of the distributive justice. Rawls acknowledges 
that the size of the public sector in capitalist 
economy, or in Rawlsian term “private prop-
erty economy,” is very small as compared to 
that of socialist economy (in which all means 
of productions are owned by the state). How-
ever, in private property economy state acts 
as an entrepreneur along with other private 
enterprises. It is because of this reason “the 
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number of publicly owned firms is presumably 
small and in any event limited to special cas-
es such as public utilities and transportation” 
(Ibid.). It would be better to discuss the essen-
tial qualities of a public good before discussing 
the institutions, which make the equitable dis-
tribution of pubic good possible. 
There are two essential qualities of a pub-
lic good namely (1) indivisibility and (2) Pub-
licness. By “indivisibility” Rawls means that 
the good is equally enjoyed by all citizens and 
cannot be divided privately and purchased 
according to one’s preferences. However, he 
acknowledges that the degree of indivisibility 
varies, due to which the pubic goods are of 
various kinds “depending upon their degree 
of indivisibility and the size of the relevant 
public.”(Ibid.) . On the other hand provision of 
the public good is the realm of the state and 
not that of the market. Rawls believes that, 
“public goods must be arranged for through 
the political process and not through the mar-
ket.”(Ibid. p.267) . The derivation and system-
atic institutionalization of the distribution of 
public goods are the major concerns of justice 
as fairness otherwise the system of social co-
operation will collapse. As a result, mutually 
disinterested individuals lose their commit-
ment with system which is conditional to the 
possibility of the realization of their self-in-
terests. Rawls identifies two major problems, 
which are associated with the idea of public 
good.
a) The problem of collective actions.
b) The problem of assurance of collective 
agreements.
The above problems are organically linked 
with each other and secondly both problems 
are resolved by a single agency i.e. state. 
The production, protection and promotion 
of public goods are financed by the revenue 
collected from the general public. The prob-
lem is that the contribution of particular in-
dividuals in the overall collection (revenue) is 
negligibly trivial. This triviality of the individ-
ual’s contribution (in the promotion /produc-
tion of pubic good) ignites a “temptation for 
each person to try to avoid doing his share.”(I-
bid.). When people realize that other mem-
bers of the society are not equally contribut-
ing in the production of public good then they 
start losing their confidence in the system. 
The lack of assurance (regarding the equal 
contribution of the other members) makes 
people skeptical about the fairness of the 
institutional structure of society. The public 
willingness regarding the payment of their fair 
share is necessarily conditioned with the in-
stitutional assurance of collective agreement. 
This implies that the collective agreement and 
its institutional assurance are the core issues 
of distributive justice according to Rawls. 
In order to resolve both problems Rawls 
depends on the “state” as a legitimate agen-
cy to provide a legal / institutional framework 
which on the one hand forces individuals to 
contribute their fair share and, on the other 
hand, provides institutional assurances re-
garding the enforcement of binding rules. The 
enforcement of binding rules through state-
craft eventually negates individual freedom 
but generally the coercion is presumed to be 
perfectly rational (in the Rawlsian sense) and 
legitimate because “the public good is every-
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one’s advantage and one that all would agree 
to arrange for.”(Ibid)
Like all others liberals Rawls also appreci-
ates the realization of the principle of efficien-
cy and liberty through market mechanism. 
But at the same the egalitarian temperament 
of Rawls urges to counter the anti-egalitari-
an consequences caused by the market, i.e., 
income disparities or inequalities, capital 
concentration which threatens the positive 
aspects of market. The conception of state 
derived from Rawls theory of justice is essen-
tially interventionist state, which counters the 
monopoly of market and avoids mafia capi-
talism. He thinks that interventionist role of 
state is necessary for the realization of the 
principles of efficiency and freedom through 
market mechanism. Rawls acknowledges that 
market essentially increases the initial advan-
tages of those who already belong to advan-
taged group. This increase in initial advantag-
es undermines the significance of efficiency 
and individuals’ freedom. The income dispar-
ities and meaninglessness of the opportunity 
principle eventually disenchant the least ad-
vantaged group and encourage them to chal-
lenge the liberal socio-political system. Rawls’ 
conception of state protects the class based 
society or market society by restraining the 
market exploitation and monopoly through 
state intervention.
Rawls differentiates between the ideal the-
ory of justice from non-ideal theory of justice. 
He believes that the ideal theory provides a 
criterion to identify the nearest possible actu-
alization of theory under given circumstances. 
Rawls opines that the two principles of justice 
are the preambles (i.e. ideal) of a constitu-
tion for the state but the constitution must be 
formulated according to the “natural circum-
stances and resources, its level of economic 
advance and political culture and so on.”(I-
bid.p.197). It implies that principles are ideal 
but their institutionalization must be compat-
ible with existing conditions, for instance, in 
the light of ground realities and given circum-
stance the equal liberties may be restricted 
for the maximization of greater equal liberty. 
Similarly, the difference principle undermines 
first principle for the maximization of greater 
equal liberties in future.
The justification of state intervention pro-
vided by Rawls is that the state is the only 
legitimate agency which assures the just dis-
tributive mechanism. He believes that “the 
indivisibility and the publicness of certain 
essential goods, and the externalities and 
temptation to which they give rise, necessi-
tate collective agreements organized and en-
forced by the state.”(Ibid.p.268) .There is no 
agency other than state which can provide 
assurance that the other citizens are doing 
their part. There are different arguments re-
garding the organic relation between the le-
gitimacy of state intervention and assurance 
problem of the state. Most of the people ar-
gue that why not the assurance problem “was 
handled within the framework of customary 
practice and personal allegiance.”( Fisk 2000. 
p.246). The political framework which Rawls 
is to deal with presumes constitutional de-
mocracy and private property economy. The 
society emerges from such institutional setup 
is a civil society in which traditional allegiance 
and collectivities (religion, tribal and kinship 
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eventually disintegrate). The social atomiza-
tion presumes self-interestedly motivated 
and marketized relationship among citizens 
as the basis of social order. The individuals 
make their existence meaningful in various 
market roles. Therefore they have to rely on a 
coercive power of state as a lender of the last 
resort. Rawls believes that market cannot pro-
vide such assurance because it lacks coercive 
administrative structure or executive power. 
Rawls takes a clear anti-monopolistic 
stance and considers monopoly as a social 
evil. It is obvious that monopoly is the unin-
tended consequence of market mechanism 
which is needed to be counter through active 
state intervention (i.e. equitable income dis-
tribution, allocation of resources, subsidiza-
tion and taxation etc.). Rawls believes that the 
monopolies result concentration of capital 
and primary social goods. So there is a need of 
coercive state structure to incorporate those 
who are left behind due to their inefficiency. 
Rawls acknowledges that a competitive 
market is desirable because of actualization 
of individual’s freedom and efficiency but he 
claims that market institutions are needed to 
be harmonized with the socio-political insti-
tutions through state intervention. It implies 
that he does not consider market mechanism 
as self-sufficient. His dependence on state as 
a re-distributive agency is of pragmatic na-
ture because he believes that “competitive 
market is not sufficient for the job of stabiliza-
tion.”(Ibid. p.249). Justice as fairness provides 
a conception of state which complements 
market mechanism. The state performs two 
functions simultaneously: firstly, it counter-
acts the monopoly of market forces through 
price control mechanism, system of taxation 
and subsidization and investment (as an inde-
pendent entrepreneur). Secondly it reduces 
the tendencies which are inherently linked 
with competitive market mechanism (i.e. 
concentration of capital, income disparities, 
Inequalities etc.) through the redistribution 
of primary social goods. It implies that in prin-
ciple Rawls is not against competitive market 
but he considers state as supportive agency 
of market. For instance the market cannot 
insure that competition begins from equal 
positions, similarly, in case of market failures 
the market cannot sustain it-self autono-
mously; it necessarily looks towards state as 
a last resort. Rawls believes that principles of 
justice in general and difference principle in 
particular preserve the market mechanism 
and through a redistributive function it keeps 
the work force intact with the system.  Raw-
ls opines that without active state interven-
tion the market mechanism does not remain 
competitive. It implies that justice as fairness 
presumes a market society and tries to make 
it competitive through active state interven-
tion. Thus unlike libertarian the competitive 
market mechanism cannot be governed and 
stabilized by invisible hand rather active state 
intervention is necessary to ensure compet-
itive and stable market. The interesting as-
pect of this relationship between market and 
state is that Rawls provides rationale for class 
based society. He thinks that classlessness is 
not the necessary condition of the fairness of 
just social order. It may be argued that what 
is the justification of this coercive state inter-
vention if the citizens already have a sense 
of justice? And they are the participants of 
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a well-ordered society. The answer is sim-
ple; Rawls’s sense of justice does not prevent 
people from invading one another through 
exploitation.”(Ibid.p.255)
Conclusion
We can summarize our discussion as fol-
lows:
1)  Politics is the domain of citizenship 
where as market is the realm of capital. Since 
Rawls believes in the autonomy of self. He 
considers individual as autonomous law giv-
er, therefore he legitimizes the sovereignty of 
individual over that of market. In this context 
the role of state presumed by Rawls is deci-
sive. In Rawlsian framework state is the only 
legitimate institution which sustains the indi-
vidual’s sovereignty, autonomy and his capac-
ity to master his destiny. It seems that Rawls 
believes that there are certain extra-market 
spaces in which extra-market relations can be 
developed. Secondly it also seems that he be-
lieves that state is the only legitimate agency 
to enforce any conception of good (derived 
by the overlapping consensus of interloc-
utors) for the general welfare of the people 
(although Rawls is very suspicious about this 
term of welfare). 
2) In the end we can say that contem-
porary discourse of economic liberalization is 
the deviation from the theoretical as well as 
institutional foundations of liberalism provid-
ed by Rawls and the result of this deviation is 
that the domination of market over state has 
been established.
3) Lastly the domination of the rational 
of capital reveals the internal crises of liberal-
ism that in absence of any alternative frame-
work like socialism etc. order of freedom and 
the order of capital are synonymous. And lib-
eral discourse is just an instrument to estab-
lish the sovereignty of global capital. 
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